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THE OHIO USE TAX
CARLTON S. DARGUSCH* AND DAROLD I. GREEKt
The economic depression has caused the states of the federal
union to seek varied and new sources of revenue. In more than
half the states the sales tax in some form or other has come to
be a substantial part of the fiscal system. In Ohio a sales tax
law has been in effect since December 13, 1934, although the
actual levy did not take place until January 27, 1935. The
sales tax law has now been extended until March 3 1, 1937, the
original act containing an expiration date of December 31,
'935. 1
In the first year of sales tax administration, Ohio found, as
have other states, that Ohio merchants and vendors could not
compete with out-of-the-state vendors who, under the protec-
tion of the interstate commerce clause of the Federal Constitu-
tion, were selling commodities tax free to Ohio consumers.
Ohio's experience has not been unique. It has been more or
less true in all the states imposing the sales tax. Washington,
California, and Oklahoma have attempted to reach the problem
through a Use Tax. Ohio has now decided to utilize the same
instrument. The Ohio Use Tax was enacted by the General
Assembly on December 2o, 1935, and signed by the Governor,
December 23, 1935, and takes affect on January i, 1936.
A very excellent pronouncement upon the legal aspects of
use taxation will be found in the North Carolina Review.
(Perkins, The Sales Tax and Transactions in Interstate Com-
merce, 12 N. C. L. Rev. 99, 1933.)
The primary reason for the commerce clause of the Fed-
eral Constitution was to make possible the free movement of
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interstate commerce. That the commerce clause of the Consti-
tution has well served its purpose is more than well established
by history. The tendency, however, has now been to impair
the movement of domestic commerce and the need has grown
so great that some solution had to be found if sales taxes were
to continue, in view of the tax threat to domestic commerce.
The solution is not to grant special privileges to local busi-
ness, but to take away those special privileges from property
which has moved in interstate commerce. The obstacles to such
a solution are found in:
i. Repeated pronouncements by the Supreme Court, pro-
hibiting state taxation of interstate commerce. Robbins v. Shel-
by Taxing District, 120 U.S. 489, 7 S. Ct. 592, 30 L. Ed. 694
(1887); Brennan v. Titusville, i53 U.S. 289, 14 S. Ct. 829,
38 L. Ed. 719 (1894); Rearick v. Pennsylvania, 203 U.S. 507,
27 S. Ct. 159, 5i L. Ed. 295 (i9o6); Crenshaw v. Arkansas,
227 U.S. 389, 33 S. Ct. 294,57 L. Ed. 565 (1913); Real Silk
Hosiery Mills v. Portland, 268 U.S. 325, 45 S. Ct. 525, 69 L.
Ed. 982 (1925).
2. Restrictions of a state's collection functions to its own
limits and the fact that a state has no extra-territorial jurisdic-
tion for taxation purposes. Standard Oil Co. v. California,
291 U.S. 242, 54 S. Ct. 381, 78 L. Ed. 775 (934); Moore v.
Mitchell, 281 U.S. i8, 50 S. Ct. 175, 74 L. Ed. 673 (1930).
The Ohio Use Tax Law tries to reach this situation by plac-
ing its own merchants on the same basis as those merchants out
of the state. It is patterned after the Ohio Sales Tax Law and
the tax is imposed at the same rate and, when collected by the
party making the sale, the collection is by means of prepaid tax
receipts. The tax is levied upon the storage, use or other con-
sumption of tangible personal property purchased from vendors
for storage, use or consumption in this state.
If a comparison of the two Acts were to be made, it would
be found that the only substantial difference is that the one
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imposes a tax upon each retail sale of tangible personal property
made in the State of Ohio, while the other imposes a tax on the
storage, use or consumption of tangible personal property and
exempts from the tax property the sale of which is subject to
the sales tax.
The primary responsibility for the payment of the use tax
is placed on the consumer who stores, uses, or otherwise con-
sumes the tangible personal property, and it is extinguished
only by payment.
The mechanics and operation of the Use Tax Act are the
same as the Sales Tax Act, in those cases where the seller of the
tangible personal property has registered with the Tax Com-
mission. In such cases the seller, or vendor, will obtain prepaid
tax receipts and collect the tax from consumers in the same
manner and at the same time as in the case of the Sales Tax Act.
In case the vendor, from whom the consumer purchases, does
not collect the tax for the state, it is the duty of the latter to file
a return with the State Tax Commission and pay the proper
amount of tax. This return is to be made at quarterly periods,
or at such other times as the Commission may prescribe.
The theory on which the use tax is based is that the state
protects the right to use tangible personal property which a con-
sumer may own and may, therefore, tax for the protection
granted. It must be borne in mind that a use tax is not in the
nature of a property tax, but is a form of excise tax.
It will be seen that the entire purpose of the Use Tax Law
is to supplement the Sales Tax Law by imposing upon those
subject to it an equivalent tax burden to that levied by the
Sales Tax Law, with substantially identical exemptions in each
case. For that reason, the Use Tax Law limits the levy to
property purchased for storage, use, or consumption within the
State of Ohio.
The courts have recognized that a tax may be imposed upon
the use as well as upon the sale of a commodity. Bowman v.
Continental Oil Co., 256 U.S. 642, 648, 41 S. Ct. 6o6, 65 L.
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Ed. 1139 (1921), and Hart Refineries v. Harmon, 278 U.S.
499, 49 S. Ct. 188, 73 L. Ed. 475 (1929). In the latter, the
court, at page 5O1, stated:
Interstate transportation having ended, the taxing power of the state
in respect of the commodity which was the subject of such transporta-
tion, may, so far as the commerce clause of the federal court is con-
cerned, be exerted in any way which the state constitution and laws
permit, provided, of course, it does not discriminate against the com-
modity because of its origin in another state. That, under such circum-
stances, a tax may be imposed upon the use as well as upon the sale of
the commodity in domestic trade, without coming into conflict with the
commerce clause, was specifically determined in Bowman v. Continen-
tal Oil Co.
Assuming that it has been established that the use of tan-
gible personal property within a state can properly be subjected
to tax, the next question is that of discrimination, when such tax
is imposed on tangible personal property which has been shipped
into the state in interstate commerce. It is fundamental, of
course, that the states cannot single out commodities which have
been shipped in interstate commerce and discriminate against
such commodities in favor of those shipped and sold in intra-
state commerce.
In view of the fact that the Use Tax Act exempts from
the tax thereby imposed the use of articles which were purchased
in such manner that the Ohio Sales Tax has been paid, it would
appear that there is discrimination. In effect, the use tax applies
practically in only those cases where the merchandise was pur-
chased in interstate commerce, as in most other cases the sales
tax wouid be applicable. It would likewise appear that the
state is attempting to do indirectly that which it cannot do
directly; i.e., impose a burden on interstate commerce. In
connection with these two apparent criticisms of the use tax, it
is interesting to note the decision of the Supreme Court of the
United States in the case of Gregg Dyeing Co. v. Query et al,
286 U.S. 472, 52S . Ct. 631, 76 L. Ed. 1232 (1932). In that
case the plaintiff attacked the validity of the South Carolina
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statute requiring every person, firm, or municipality, which im-
ported gasoline and kept it in storage for future use in that
state, to pay a license tax of six (6) cents per gallon. The stat-
ute in quesiton exempted from the application of the tax any
gasoline which had been subjected to the payment of the license
taxes imposed by other statutes of the state. The plaintiff, the
Gregg Dyeing Co., purchased gasoline in bulk from dealers
outside the state of South Carolina and had it shipped into the
state to the plaintiff's plant, where it was unloaded and stored
until needed for use. It was contended that the tax was a bur-
den on interstate commerce and that it was discriminatory in
that a refinery maintained by the Standard Oil Company did
not pay a tax on gasoline which it produced and stored, or im-
ported and stored in South Carolina for purpose of sale.
The Supreme Court of the State of South Carolina upheld
the constitutionality of the act in question for the reason that it
was no burden on interstate commerce, for the act operated only
after the commodity had been severed from its interstate char-
acter and had become at rest as a general mass of property in
the state. It was pointed out further that the tax was an excise
tax and not a property tax and that all oil companies in South
Carolina were required to pay a tax on gasoline sold or used in
the state. The state court held that the act in question was not
discriminatory for it was complementary to the other statutes
of South Carolina under which there was assessed the gallonage
tax on gasoline and other petroleum products.
The Supreme Court of the United States affirmed the de-
cision of the state court and in the opinion pointed out that
there was no demand in the Federal Constitution that an act
passed by a state legislature must be constitutional "within its
four corners." The constitutionality of a state taxing scheme
is to be determined by substance rather than by form, and when
the supreme court of the state has held that two or more stat-
utes may be taken together, the Supreme Court of the United
States will accept that conclusion as if written into the statutes
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themselves. The court in this case likewise ruled that the same
consideration, with respect to discriminations, applied to the
claim that a statute violates the equal protection clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.
In applying the rule laid down by the Supreme Court in
the case of Gregg Dyeing Co. v. Query et al to the Ohio situa-
tion, we are led to believe that the use tax is constitutional for
it is not discriminatory, does not deny equal protection of the
laws and does not place a burden on interstate commerce.
Reading and construing the Sales Tax Act and the Use Tax
Act together, we find that the consumer of tangible personal
property must pay exactly the same amount of tax, regardless
of whether the property consumed is purchased within or with-
out the state.
Critics of the use tax point out that after granting such tax
is constitutional and may be levied legally, the administration
problems in connection therewith will be numerous and com-
plicated. The chief obstacle in administration is the fact that
in many cases collection must be made from consumers who are
placed under the responsibility of payment of the tax. Parties
liable for the tax have a good chance of evading it, due to their
numbers. This obstacle is overcome in large part by requiring
retailers of tangible personal property to collect the tax as
agents of the state. In connection with this matter, it should
be noted that there are two classes of vendors who will make
sales in interstate commerce: first, those who maintain retail
establishments or agents in the state; and second, those who sell
direct and do not maintain agents or retail establishments.
The Act requires that those vendors who have agents or
places of business within the State of Ohio must register with
the Tax Commission and collect the tax on all sales to the con-
sumer, even though the shipment may originate in another state.
That the state has this power to require retailers, maintaining
places of business in a state, to collect an excise tax, even though
a portion of their sales may involve shipments in interstate com-
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merce, was settled in the case of Monamotor Oil Company v.
Johnson, 292 U.S. 86, 54 S. Ct. 575, 78 L. Ed. 11W1 (1934):
The appellant, however, says that the state officials have required it
to report and to pay tax on shipments made from Oklahoma direct to
dealers in Iowa, who are appellant's customers, and that in respect of
such transactions the burden on interstate commerce is obvious. But if
the gasoline so imported is intended to be used in Iowa for motor vehicle
fuel, it is subject to the tax. If it is not so used by the appellant's cus-
tomer, or by the purchaser at retail, either may obtain a refund of the tax
collected by the appellant and remitted to the state. The statute obvi-
ously was not intended to reach transactions in interstate commerce, but
to tax the use of motor fuel after it had come to rest in Iowa, and
the requirement that the appellant as the shipper into Iowa shall, as agent
of the state, report and pay the tax on the gasoline thus coming into
the state for use by others on whom the tax falls imposes no unconsti-
tutional burden either upon interstate commerce or upon the appellant.
As to those retailers who do not maintain places of business
within the State of Ohio and who, therefore, cannot be forced
to collect the tax as they are outside the jurisdiction of Ohio,
it is believed that many will voluntarily register with the Tax
Commission and collect the tax so that their customers may not
be harassed and placed under the inconvenience of making out
and filing returns with the state.
If the use tax is finally held to be constitutional, as we con-
fidently expect it to be, the problems of unfair competition at-
tributable to interstate commerce will largely be eliminated,
and Ohio's merchants will be relieved of the discrimination
which they have been compelled to bear upon the domestic com-
merce of this state.
